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PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF SPENDING 
CONDITIONS AFTER DOUGLAS 
KATHERINE MORAN MEEKS† 
Congress cannot compel the states to implement its regulatory agenda, 
but it may purchase their compliance through the exercise of its spending 
power.1 Today, the federal government achieves many of its signature 
policy goals, including the provision of Medicaid benefits to the poor, 
disabled, and elderly, in cooperation with the states.2 These joint spending 
programs promote federalism values, but they also place important federal 
initiatives at the mercy of state budgetary pressures. When the economy 
falters and state revenues decline, entitlement programs like Medicaid 
become a perennial target for cuts. In Douglas v. Independent Living Center of 
Southern California, Inc., a case from the 2011 term, the Supreme Court 
considered whether hospitals and other private parties have an implied right 
of action under the Supremacy Clause to challenge the sufficiency of state 
payments under a cooperative spending program.3 
 
† J.D., summa cum laude, University of Pennsylvania Law School. The author was the editor-in-
chief of Volume 160 of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. She thanks Professor Theodore 
Ruger for his guidance during the drafting of this paper and D. Benjamin Thomas, Erin Borek, 
Ethan Simonowitz, and Nicholas J. Giles for their careful work getting it ready for publication. 
1 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (“Congress may attach conditions on the receipt 
of federal funds, and has repeatedly employed the power ‘to further broad policy objectives by 
conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance . . . with federal statutory and administrative 
directives.’” (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.))).  
2 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy 
Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 815 (1998) (explaining the theory 
of cooperative federalism, by which state and local governments share policymaking responsibility 
with the federal government in areas ranging from unemployment insurance to historic preservation).  
3 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1207 (2012). 
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In this Case Note, I explore the background, history, and resolution of 
the Douglas litigation in the Supreme Court. I argue that the Court was 
right to suggest that private enforcement of the Medicaid statute sits 
uncomfortably within the system of agency oversight prescribed by Con-
gress. But that is not to say that a Supremacy Clause action should never be 
available in the spending context. Though some scholars have likened joint 
spending programs to contracts between the state and federal governments, 
an analogy that might suggest a limited role for private parties in enforcing 
their terms,4 I reject that view and explore some cases in which a Supremacy 
Clause action would be appropriate.  
I. MEDICAID’S EQUAL ACCESS PROVISION 
Congress created Medicaid in 1965 to provide health insurance to cer-
tain vulnerable populations, including the blind, disabled, elderly, and 
children from needy families. 5  Unlike Medicare, which is funded and 
administered entirely by the federal government, Medicaid is a miscellany 
of fifty-six health insurance programs run by the states and territories with 
substantial financial assistance from the federal government.6 Until the 
passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), states 
had considerable discretion to limit the class of individuals they would 
insure;7 they retain discretion even now to design the package of benefits 
and set payment rates for doctors, hospitals, and other providers.8 The 
states submit “plans for medical assistance” that outline the substance of 
their program to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).9 
 
4 See, e.g., David E. Engdahl, The Contract Thesis of the Federal Spending Power, 52 S.D. 
L. REV. 496 (2007). 
5 See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS 
COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON MEDICAID AND CHIP 28 (2011). 
6 KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID: A PRIMER 5 (2010). 
7 In the ACA, Congress required the states to extend Medicaid coverage to all eligible individu-
als under the age of sixty-five who earn less than 133% of the federal poverty level. See HINDA 
CHAIKIND ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PPACA: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE LAW, IMPLE-
MENTATION, & LEGAL CHALLENGES 2 (2011). The Supreme Court struck down that requirement 
as unduly coercive in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, holding that Congress 
could not induce the states to expand coverage by threatening to withdraw all Medicaid funding if 
they refused to do so. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606-07 (2012). The Medicaid expansion is not a dead letter, 
however. Congress may still offer substantial financial inducement for states to expand their 
Medicaid rolls; it simply may not force them to do so under pain of penalty. Id.  
8 See KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 6, at 5. 
9 Financing and Reimbursement, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-
Program-Information/By-Topics/Financing-and-Reimbursement/Financing-and-Reimbursement 
.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2012); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (2006) (describing the require-
ments for a state medical assistance plan). 
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If approved, the federal government reimburses states between fifty and 
eighty-three percent of the cost of providing care.10 In fiscal year 2010, the 
federal and state governments spent a combined $406 billion to fund health 
insurance coverage for sixty-eight million people.11 
Congress attaches numerous conditions to the Medicaid funds it pro-
vides to the states. Although participation in Medicaid is voluntary, these 
conditions bind the states once they join the program,12 as all of them had 
by 1982.13 The condition at issue in Douglas, the so-called equal access 
provision, requires that states 
provide such methods and procedures relating to the utilization of, and the 
payment for, care and services available under the plan . . . to assure that 
payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and 
are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are availa-
ble under the plan at least to the extent that such care and services are 
available to the general population in the geographic area.14 
The courts of appeals have divided in interpreting the demands this 
provision places on the states. The Ninth Circuit, for example, requires 
states to gather data and to reimburse providers at rates that “bear a reason-
able relationship” to the cost of providing services,15 while the Seventh 
Circuit does not mandate that the states consider real-world costs.16 No 
matter what the operative legal standard, in practice Medicaid reimburses 
providers only a fraction of what they would receive from Medicare or 
private insurers.17 That Medicaid trails these other payers is largely a 
function of state budget pressures. Unlike the federal government, most 
 
10 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b)(1). 
11 MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, supra note 5, at 2, 38.  
12 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980); Hope Med. Grp. for Women v. Edwards, 
63 F.3d 418, 421 (5th Cir. 1995).  
13 In 1982, Arizona became the last state to participate in Medicaid. See Nicole Huberfeld, 
Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 445 n.69 (2011).  
14 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) .  
15 See Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1498 (9th Cir. 1997). 
16 See Methodist Hosps., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1030 (7th Cir. 1996) (reasoning that 
§ 1396a(a)(30) “requires each state to produce a result, not to employ any particular methodology 
for getting there”); see also Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 26,342, 26,343 (May 6, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 447) (noting that the split in 
the circuits has subjected states “to considerable uncertainty as they move forward in designing 
service delivery systems and payment methodologies”). 
17 See 146 CONG. REC. E2083 (2000) (extension of remarks of Rep. John D. Dingell) (la-
menting that “Medicaid payment rates are a fraction of what Medicare pays,” and giving 
examples); Denise Grady, Children on Medicaid Shown to Wait Longer for Care, N.Y. TIMES, June 
16, 2011, at A24 (citing a study indicating that primary care doctors in Illinois receive $160 from 
private insurers for a basic office visit, compared to $99.86 from Medicaid). 
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states must balance their budgets.18 Medicaid consumes the “largest or second-
largest share of state budgets,”19 and thus becomes a perennial target for savings 
when the economy slows and state revenues falter20—especially because, unlike 
many state employees, private health care providers are not protected by union 
contracts.21 In some states, payments have dwindled to the point that doctors 
simply refuse to treat Medicaid patients. One woman told the Los Angeles Times 
that she spent more than six months searching for a doctor who would fit 
medical braces on her son, a Medicaid recipient who suffers from spina bifida; 
22 the same article quoted a primary care doctor who could not locate a single 
neurologist in the region to treat his Medicaid patients.23 
States have whittled Medicaid payments with impunity because CMS 
has only one tool to cudgel compliance with the equal access provision, and 
it is both exceedingly harsh and rarely, if ever, used.24 If the agency deter-
mines that a state’s management of its Medicaid program has failed “to 
comply substantially” with federal conditions, it may cease making all or 
part of the payments that would otherwise be due to the state to support 
health insurance for the poor.25 As many commentators have noted, CMS 
will almost never invoke this remedy against recalcitrant states because 
withholding funds would inevitably harm the vulnerable populations, 
including children, pregnant women, and the disabled, for whom Medicaid 
provides a critical safety net.26 Rather than strong-arm the states, the 
agency seeks their cooperation through soft political persuasion and directs 
its limited enforcement resources to preventing fraud by doctors, hospitals, 
and other private-sector providers.27 In an amicus brief filed in the Douglas 
 
18 MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, supra note 5, at 20. For an overview 
of state balanced budget provisions, see NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, NCSL FISCAL 
BRIEF: STATE BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS (2012), available at http://www.ncsl.org/ 
documents/fiscal/StateBalancedBudgetProvisions2010.pdf. 
19 MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, supra note 5, at 38. 
20 Id. at 20. 
21 See George Skelton, Tax Loophole Saved At Expense of Poor, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2008, at B1 (quot-
ing a state senator who said it was easier to cut reimbursements to doctors than to reduce the salaries of 
“teachers or prison guards or highway patrolmen” because the former do not have union contracts). 
22 See Evan Halper, Further Fee Cuts Force a Medi-Cal Exodus, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2008, at A1.  
23 Id.	
24 See Nicole Huberfeld, Post-Reform Medicaid Before the Court: Discordant Advocacy Reflects 
Conflicting Attitudes, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 513, 522 (2012) (“[T]otal funding withdrawal has 
never happened, seemingly because CMS recognizes the draconian and counterproductive nature 
of penalizing states in this way.”). 
25 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2006) (authorizing CMS to withhold payments to states); 42 
C.F.R. § 430.35(a) (2011) (enumerating bases for withholding payments). 
26 E.g., Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and Medi-
caid Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413, 462-63 (2008). 
27 Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault on Litigation: Why (and How) It Might Be 
Good for Health Law, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2323, 2340-41 (2010). 
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case, former Health and Human Services officials likened the federal 
agency not to “a referee calling fouls,” but to “a coach giving support in the 
form of cash and expertise.”28 Even if the agency were inclined to pursue 
more vigorous enforcement, these officials noted, it would not have the 
manpower: a staff of fewer than five hundred bears responsibility for 
overseeing Medicaid programs in fifty states and six territories.29 
Even as administrative enforcement has proven anemic, the Supreme 
Court has narrowed the field of statutes that private litigants may enforce 
under 42 U.S.C § 1983—the statute that supplies a remedy for violations of 
federal rights.30 For a time, the Court was willing to locate enforceable 
rights in Spending Clause statutes such as the Medicaid Act. In Wilder v. 
Virginia Hospital Association, the Court allowed hospitals to maintain a 
§ 1983 suit to challenge Virginia’s tightfisted reimbursement rates as 
inconsistent with the Boren Amendment, a section of the Medicaid Act that 
required states to set payments at a level the “State finds . . . reasonable 
and adequate to meet the costs” of providing care.31 The majority found 
that this language gave hospitals a substantive right to reasonable pay-
ment,32 even though it arguably imposed only a procedural requirement on 
states to make findings about the sufficiency of their Medicaid rates.33 After 
Congress repealed the Boren Amendment in 1997, the courts of appeals 
continued to recognize rights-creating language in other Medicaid funding 
conditions, including the equal access provision.34 Indeed, when he was still 
a judge on the Third Circuit, Justice Alito suggested in dictum that Medi-
caid patients, if not providers, could proceed under § 1983 to enforce the 
equal access provision because they “plainly satisfy the intend-to-benefit 
requirement.”35 Then-Judge Alito excavated legislative history from 1981, 
when Congress added the equal access provision to the statute, to support 
his conclusion that Congress intended the courts “to take appropriate 
 
28 Brief of Former HHS Officials as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 22, Douglas 
v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) (No. 09-958), 2011 WL 3706105 
(quoting Edward A. Tomlinson & Jerry L. Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal Standards in Grant-
in-Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L. REV. 600, 620 (1972)).  
29 Id. at 19.  
30 In Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980), the Supreme Court held that § 1983 may be 
used to enforce rights created by federal statute, as well as by the Constitution. 
31 496 U.S. 498, 501-02 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (Supp. V 1982)). 
32 Id. at 510. 
33 Id. at 527-28 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the law granted, at most, a right to the 
“establishment of rates in accordance with that process,” rather than a right to any substantive result). 
34 See e.g., Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 927-28 (5th Cir. 
2000) (concluding that § 30(A) is phrased in terms of patient benefit and thus supports a private 
right of action), abrogated by Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2007).  
35 Pa. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 543-44 (3d Cir. 2002) (en banc).  
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remedial action” where either the states or CMS failed to abide by the 
Medicaid Act’s requirements.36 
The landscape changed with Gonzaga University v. Doe, an important 
2002 decision in which the Supreme Court offered a narrow interpretation 
of when federal funding conditions can support a private right of action 
under § 1983.37  The plaintiff, a former student at Gonzaga, sued the 
university for releasing his records to a prospective employer, allegedly in 
violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974.38 
Congress passed this statute under its spending authority, granting federal 
funds to universities on the condition that they not maintain “a policy or 
practice” of releasing student records without written consent.39 The Court 
rebuffed the plaintiff’s suit, holding that he could not enforce the statute 
using § 1983 because the funding condition imposed only a general duty on 
the grant recipients and did not confer an individual right against disclo-
sure.40 Having noted in previous cases that the plain language speaks of 
“rights, privileges, and immunities,”41 the Court emphasized that § 1983 
provides a remedy only where a statute includes “rights-creating language” 
and is clearly intended to benefit a particular class of plaintiffs.42 In so 
doing, the Court demanded a clear statement from Congress before it 
would read funding conditions to create rights that may be vindicated via 
§ 1983: “We made clear that unless Congress speaks with a clear voice, and 
manifests an unambiguous intent to confer individual rights, federal 
funding provisions provide no basis for private enforcement by § 1983.”43 
Accordingly, “it is rights, not the broader or vaguer ‘benefits’ or ‘interests,’ 
that may be enforced under the authority of that section.”44 
Importantly, the Court held that a plaintiff suing under § 1983 must 
meet the same threshold requirement as a plaintiff asserting an implied 
right of action: he must demonstrate that “Congress intended to create a 
federal right.”45 In both settings, the Court will find statutes to confer 
 
36 Id. at 541 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 97-158, at 301 (1981)).  
37 536 U.S. 273 (2002).  
38 Id. at 277. 
39 Id. at 278-79. 
40 Id. at 287. 
41 Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 (1990) (quoting Golden State Transit Corp. v. 
Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989)). 
42 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 290. 
43 Id. at 280 (brackets and internal quotation omitted). 
44 Id. at 283; see also Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cnty., 131 S. Ct. 1342, 1347 (2011) 
(“Recognition of any private right of action for violating a federal statute, currently governing 
decisions instruct, must ultimately rest on congressional intent to provide a private remedy.” 
(brackets and internal quotation omitted)).  
45 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283 (emphasis omitted). 
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individual rights only when they are “phrased in terms of the persons 
benefited”46 or evince concern for “whether the needs of any particular 
person have been satisfied;”47 an “aggregate focus” does not beget enforceable 
rights.48 The implied right of action and § 1983 inquiries differ only in that 
plaintiffs proceeding under the former must show that Congress intended 
to furnish both a right and a private remedy; this showing is unnecessary 
with the latter because § 1983 itself affords the remedy.49 
Since Gonzaga, the courts of appeals have almost uniformly held that 
Medicaid’s equal access provision does not contain the sort of rights-
creating language that would permit private enforcement under § 1983.50 
The Ninth Circuit, for instance, found that the provision embraces “flexible, 
administrative standards” that do not “unmistakably” telegraph Congress’s 
intent to create a right for either providers or beneficiaries.51 To the contrary, 
the court found that the statute encompassed competing objectives, direct-
ing the states to provide payments that were efficient and economical, and 
thus taxpayer-protective, while simultaneously ensuring broad-based access 
to care.52 It concluded that this internal tension “supports the conclusion 
that § 30(A) is concerned with overall methodology rather than conferring 
individually enforceable rights on individual Medicaid recipients.”53 With 
the § 1983 right of action all but foreclosed, Medicaid patients and provid-
ers had to seek another avenue into federal court when California reduced 
its already meager reimbursements in 2008. 
II. DOUGLAS: FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW 
In January 2008, California was in a fiscal tailspin. With the state facing 
a $14.5 billion deficit, the governor declared an emergency and urged 
lawmakers to consider a package of austere cuts: releasing inmates from 
 
46 Id. at 284 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979)).  
47 Id. at 288 (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 343 (1997)). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 284. 
50 See Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697, 704 (5th Cir. 2007); Mandy 
R. ex rel. Mr. and Mrs. R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139, 1148 (10th Cir. 2006); Westside Mothers v. 
Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 542-43 (6th Cir. 2006); N.Y. Ass’n of Homes & Servs. for the Aging v. 
DeBuono, 444 F.3d 147, 148 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Long Term Care Pharmacy Alliance v. 
Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 59 (1st Cir. 2004). But see Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of 
Human Servs., 443 F.3d 1005, 1015-16 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that since the Supreme Court did 
not overrule Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, 496 U.S. 498 (1990), the equal access provision 
could still create a federal right).  
51 Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2005).  
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 1059-60. 
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overcrowded prisons, slashing funding for local school districts, and reduc-
ing remuneration for the physicians, hospitals, and pharmacies that serve 
the state’s Medicaid population.54 The state’s payments to health care 
providers were already the lowest in the nation, and legislators recognized 
that further beggaring of the reimbursement rates would discourage provid-
ers from accepting Medicaid patients and deprive the poor of critical access 
to care.55 One Republican lawmaker warned during the budget debates that 
retrenchment would “lead to the demise of the Medi-Cal program as we 
know it.” 56  Despite deep misgivings from both parties, the legislature 
cinched payments to health care providers by as much as ten percent.57 To 
lawmakers, the decision was a Hobson’s choice necessitated by fiscal crisis; 
to the patients and providers who brought suit to challenge the new rates, it 
was a bald-faced violation of the Medicaid statute’s equal access provision. 
In a flurry of lawsuits eventually consolidated before the Supreme Court, 
these patients and providers sought injunctions to prevent the state health 
director from implementing the new payment schedules. 
The plaintiffs proposed a novel theory in Douglas v. Independent Living 
Center.58 Unable to proceed under § 1983, they claimed to have an implied 
right of action under the Supremacy Clause to challenge the sufficiency of 
state payments in federal court.59 They reasoned that Medicaid’s equal 
access provision, also referred to as § 30(A), creates a binding obligation 
that preempts incompatible state laws setting payment rates too low to 
ensure sufficient access to care.60 Importantly, they argued that a federal 
right under § 30(A) is not required when a party sues on a preemption 
theory.61 Instead, they argued that the Supremacy Clause is a ballast that 
helps maintain the proper balance of power between the federal government 
and the states, and that private litigants may enforce those “structural” 
protections as long as they satisfy the standing requirement of Article III.62  
 
54 Evan Halper, Governor’s Budget Derails His Lofty Goals, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2008, at A1; 
see also Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1936 (2011) (attributing unsafe and unsanitary conditions 
in California state prisons to “chronic and worsening budget shortfalls”). 
55 Skelton, supra note 21. 
56 Id. 
57 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14105.19(b)(1) (West 2012). 
58 One of the attorneys involved in the case, Rochelle Bobroff, helped develop this theory in 
the academic literature. See generally Rochelle Bobroff, Section 1983 and Preemption: Alternative 
Means of Court Access for Safety Net Statutes, 10 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 27 (2008).  
59 See Brief of Respondents Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital at 12-13, Douglas v. Indep. Liv-
ing Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) (No. 10-283), 2011 WL 3288334. 
60 Id. at 9. 
61 Id. at 22. 
62 Id. at 24-26. 
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The plaintiffs found a receptive audience in the Ninth Circuit, which con-
cluded that the Supremacy Clause does indeed provide a private right of 
action for plaintiffs seeking to challenge state compliance with federal 
funding conditions.63 Although it was not one of the rulings challenged before 
the Supreme Court,64 the Ninth Circuit gave its fullest articulation of this 
principle in 2008, in an earlier stage of the Douglas litigation.65 Judge Marsha 
S. Berzon’s opinion for the court of appeals held that plaintiffs do not need an 
antecedent federal right in order to bring a preemption claim.66 The panel 
reasoned that such a requirement would conflate a Supremacy Clause right of 
action with a § 1983 action, when they in fact afford plaintiffs alternative 
avenues of relief.67 The panel observed that the Supreme Court has “consist-
ently assumed” that the Supremacy Clause supplies a right of action for 
plaintiffs challenging the incongruity of state and federal law, but “without 
comment” on the source or scope of that action.68 Other commentators have 
also noted that the Court has reached the merits of many preemption claims 
without clearly identifying the underlying right of action.69 It may do this 
because the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over preemption 
claims, which present a federal question,70 even if plaintiffs have only an 
“arguable,” as opposed to a “valid,” right of action.71  
 
63 Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1058 (9th Cir. 2008).	
64 The seven decisions that were joined in Douglas are as follows: Santa Rosa Mem’l Hosp. v. 
Maxwell-Jolly, 380 F. App’x 656 (9th Cir. 2010); Dominguez v. Schwarzenegger, 596 F.3d 1087 
(9th Cir. 2010); Cal. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 596 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2010); Indep. 
Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 374 F. App’x 690 (9th Cir. 2010); Indep. Living Ctr. 
of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 342 F. App’x 306 (9th Cir. 2009); Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 
Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2009); and Cal. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 
563 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 2009). 
65 Shewry, 543 F.3d at 1062. 
66 Id. at 1058. 
67 Id. at 1062 (citing Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 509 (8th Cir. 2006)); see also Alo-
haCare v. Hawaii Dep’t of Human Servs., 572 F.3d 740, 745 (9th Cir. 2009); David Sloss, 
Constitutional Remedies for Statutory Violations, 89 IOWA L. REV. 355, 362-63 (2004). 
68 Shewry, 543 F.3d at 1055-56; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 9, Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) (No. 09-958), 
2011 WL 2132705 (“Although the Court has not explored the nature or source of the cause of action, 
its cases reflect a longstanding practice of permitting private parties to bring suit in federal court to 
enjoin state regulatory action from which the plaintiffs claim immunity under federal law.”). 
69 E.g., Bradley J. Sayles, Preemption or Bust: A Review of the Recent Trends in Medicaid 
Preemption Actions, 27 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 120, 133 (2010). 
70 See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1983) (“A plaintiff who seeks injunc-
tive relief from state regulation, on the ground that such regulation is pre-empted by a federal statute 
which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must prevail, thus presents a federal 
question which the federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve.”). 
71 See Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 642-43 (2002) (“It is 
firmly established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action 
12 Meeks Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  11/27/2012 1:20 PM 
2012] Spending Conditions After Douglas 65 
For more than a century, the Court has allowed private parties to seek 
injunctions to prevent the implementation of state laws that conflict with 
federal laws. In Ex parte Young, a group of railroads sued the Minnesota 
attorney general to block a state order reducing the maximum rates that 
railroads could charge for freight and passengers.72 The railroads claimed 
that the new rates were “unjust, unreasonable, and confiscatory” and 
deprived them of property without due process of law.73 The Supreme 
Court held that the federal courts possess inherent power to issue an 
injunction to prevent state officers from executing laws that violate the 
Constitution.74 Without Young, a party wishing to challenge a state law 
might have to wait for the state to enforce the law against him and then 
assert its unconstitutionality as a defense. Young allowed litigants to use 
the Constitution as a sword to preempt the enforcement of state statutes 
that conflict with federal law.75 Although such actions are for all intents 
and purposes directed at the state, the Court invented a legal fiction to 
avoid the Eleventh Amendment bar on suits against the states: state 
officers act ultra vires when they implement unconstitutional laws and 
thus may be sued in their individual capacity.76 
Plaintiffs seeking to block a state law or policy under Young may sue for 
injunctive relief, not for damages,77 but this limitation does not bar injunc-
tions that may impact the state fisc.78 As scholars have recognized, Ex parte 
Young provides a critical means for the courts to rein in the states when 
 
does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to 
adjudicate the case.” (internal quotation omitted)); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) 
(“Jurisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a 
cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover.”). 
72 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 130 (1908). 
73 Id. 
74 See id. at 155-56 (“[O]fficers of the state . . . violating the Federal Constitution, may be 
enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action.”). 
75 See John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989, 990 (2008) (“Ex parte Young 
approved the use against a state officer of a standard tool of equity, an injunction to restrain 
proceedings at law. Through an anti-suit injunction a party who would be the defendant in a 
corresponding lawsuit can enforce in equity a legal position that would be a defense at law.”).  
76 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60: 
If the act which the state attorney general seeks to enforce be a violation of the Fed-
eral Constitution, the officer, in proceeding under such enactment, comes into conflict 
with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his 
official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences 
of his individual conduct. The state has no power to impart to him any immunity 
from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States. 
77 LINDA MULLENIX ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL COURTS AND JURISDICTION 491 (1998). 
78 See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289 (1977) (holding that federal courts may grant injunc-
tive relief against state officials “notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury”). 
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their laws threaten to frustrate federal law or policy, thus maintaining the 
balance of power between the federal government and the states.79 While 
the case law clearly allows for injunctive relief in cases of direct federal-state 
conflict, it is less clear that plaintiffs may invoke Young if the state is failing 
to discharge its obligations under a cooperative spending program moni-
tored by a federal administrative agency.  
The United States, supporting California as amicus curiae in Douglas, 
argued that the federal-state relationship takes on a different hue in the 
context of such joint programs.80 First, the solicitor general questioned 
whether preemption is even at issue when states merely underperform in 
providing benefits mandated by a federal spending program.81 Preemption, 
the Unites States said, comes into play only when federal law collides with a 
“wholly independent state program dealing with the same or a similar 
problem.”82 In this case, California was not attempting to regulate in a field 
where federal law already prescribed the rules of conduct. Instead, it was 
providing benefits at the direction of the federal government and with 
subsidies from the federal purse. While the state’s meager payments under 
the Medi-Cal program might have been insufficient to fully realize the 
federal government’s goal of providing health care to the poor, they did not 
actively undermine the federal prerogative as a contrary regulation would.  
Second, the United States argued that a private right of action under the 
Supremacy Clause would sit uncomfortably not only with the Court’s 
implied right of action and § 1983 jurisprudence, but also with the contractu-
al nature of the federal-state spending program.83 The government’s brief 
intimated that private enforcement would disrupt the harmonious state of 
affairs between the federal government and the states: “Recognition of a 
nonstatutory cause of action for Medicaid providers and beneficiaries in this 
setting would be in tension with the nature of the federal-state relation-
ship and the enforcement scheme contemplated by the statute.”84 The 
Medicaid statute envisions that the federal and state governments will 
work together as allies and collaborators; preemption means that the 
federal government is bigfooting the states.85  
 
79 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 435 (5th ed. 2007) (“Without Young, federal 
courts often would be powerless to prevent state violations of the Constitution and federal laws.”). 
80 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 68, at 16-17. 
81 Id. at 21-22.  
82 Id. (quoting N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 411 n.9 (1973)). 
83 Id. at 25. 
84 Id. 
85 Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2632-33 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, and dissenting in part) (noting that Medicaid “is 
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III. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN DOUGLAS 
In Douglas, the Supreme Court left unanswered whether the Supremacy 
Clause provides a private right of action to enforce federal spending 
conditions.86 The case’s factual underpinnings had changed since certiorari 
was granted the year before, and the five-member majority concluded that 
the case could benefit from further briefing and argument in the court of 
appeals.87 At the time the Court agreed to review the Ninth Circuit’s 
decisions, CMS had rejected California’s Medicaid reductions because the 
state had not shown that the new rates were “sufficient to enlist enough 
providers,” as required by the equal access provision.88 Less than a month 
after oral argument, however, the agency completed the formal administra-
tive review sought by the state and retroactively approved some of the 
state’s cuts.89 “In light of the changed circumstances,” the Court wrote, “we 
believe that the question before us now is whether, once the agency has 
approved the state statutes, groups of Medicaid providers and beneficiaries 
may still maintain a Supremacy Clause action asserting that those statutes 
are inconsistent with the federal Medicaid law.”90 The Court remanded the 
case for the court of appeals to decide the question in the first instance.91  
At the same time, Justice Breyer’s opinion for the five-member majority 
left the distinct impression that, once the federal agency had approved the 
new rates, the plaintiffs should proceed under the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA), not the Supremacy Clause.92 Federal courts apply a deferential 
standard of review to agency actions, setting aside agency decisions under 
the APA only if they are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.93 If 
courts were to accord less deference in actions brought under the Suprema-
cy Clause, they might “make superfluous or . . . undermine traditional 
APA review.”94 What is more, conflicting decisions issued by the agency 
 
designed to advance cooperative federalism,” affords states “considerable autonomy,” and gives 
them more influence than they would have had if Congress had “established Medicaid as an 
exclusively federal program” (internal quotation omitted)). 
86 Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1211 (2012) (“In the pre-
sent posture of these cases, we do not address whether the Ninth Circuit properly recognized a 
Supremacy Clause action to enforce this federal statute before the agency took final action.”).  
87 Id. at 1207-08. 
88 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 68, at 8. 
89 See Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1209; see also Letter from Donald B. Verrilli Jr., U.S. Solicitor 
General, to William K. Suter, Clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court (Oct. 28, 2011) (on file with the 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review).  
90 Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1207. 
91 Id. at 1208. 
92 Id. at 1211. 
93 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). 
94 Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1211.  
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and the courts of appeals could sow confusion and imperil “the uniformity 
that Congress intended by centralizing administration of the federal 
program in the agency.”95 The decision echoed Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa 
Clara County in its concern that private enforcement could disrupt the 
consistency that comes with vesting oversight in a single agency.96 In 
Astra, the Court barred public hospitals and clinics from suing drug 
manufacturers for breach of a price-ceiling contract that the manufac-
turers signed with the federal government as a condition of participat-
ing in the Medicaid program.97 The Court reasoned that private rights 
of action might produce conflicting decisions in the courts of appeals 
and “undermine the agency’s efforts to administer both Medicaid and 
§ 340B harmoniously and on a uniform, nationwide basis.”98 
The Douglas majority offered no comment on whether plaintiffs had a 
cause of action to enjoin the rate reductions before the agency decided 
whether the cuts complied with the Medicaid Act. States must seek agency 
approval to amend their Medicaid plans, including the payments they make 
to health care providers, and the process often drags on for months or even 
years.99 As Justice Kagan noted during oral argument, California implemented 
its 2008 rate reductions before the agency had completed its review of the 
changes to the state plan.100 If plaintiffs could bring suit under the Suprem-
acy Clause, a federal court could issue an injunction to preserve the status 
quo and ensure that the state did not unilaterally slash its Medicaid  
program while it waited for the agency to issue a decision.101 In this way, 
the private right of action would be a helpmate, not a hindrance, to agency 
enforcement.102 Because the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for retroactive 
recovery of benefits,103 states may attempt to save money by exploiting the 
lag time during which the agency is reviewing the rate changes. This is 
 
95 Id. at 1211; see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996) (holding that 
an Ex parte Young action would not lie where Congress had created a complex and detailed 
administrative scheme for enforcing a federal right).  
96 See Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cnty., 131 S. Ct. 1342, 1349 (2011). 
97 Id. at 1345. 
98 Id. at 1349. 
99 Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption as a Judicial End-Run Around the Administrative Process?, 
122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 2 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/04/30/sharkey.html. 
100 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 
S. Ct. 1204 (2012) (No. 09-958) (Kagan, J.).  
101 At oral argument, Justice Breyer suggested that the Court could issue an injunction and then refer 
the merits of the claim to the agency under the primary jurisdiction doctrine. See id. at 38 (Breyer, J.). 
102 See Sharkey, supra note 99, at 4 (“On that view, APA review remains the preferred route, 
but private parties need an additional, limited court option to hold the states at bay until the 
agency makes a final determination.”).  
103 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974). 
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especially true because the population that would benefit from more robust 
Medicaid payments, including the poor and disabled, may not have the 
political clout of other groups to lobby for a share of limited state funds.104  
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the four dissenters, would have held 
that the Supremacy Clause does not supply a right of action where, as here, 
the statute does not explicitly provide one.105 He viewed the clause as a rule 
of decision that ensures federal law will trump state law whenever the two 
conflict.106 It secures federal power by giving effect to Congress’s intent, 
but it does not of its own force provide “a source of any federal rights.”107 In 
the dissenters’ view, recognizing an implied right of action under the 
Supremacy Clause would impermissibly amplify the substantive right or 
benefit that Congress intended to provide: “Saying that there is a private 
right of action under the Supremacy Clause would substantively change the 
federal rule established by Congress in the Medicaid Act. That is not a 
proper role for the Supremacy Clause, which simply ensures that the rule 
established by Congress controls.”108 In the Chief Justice’s view, a Suprem-
acy Clause right of action would also allow litigants to make “a complete 
end-run” around the limits the Court has placed on implied statutory and 
§ 1983 rights of action in cases such as Gonzaga.109 As he said at oral 
argument, “We’ve wasted a lot of time trying to figure out whether 
there’s an implied right of action under a particular statute if there has 
always been one under the Supremacy Clause.”110 
Chief Justice Roberts left open the possibility that a Supremacy 
Clause action might lie in cases where the exercise of the Court’s equita-
ble power would “give[] effect to the federal rule, rather than contraven[e] 
 
104 At the same time, physicians, hospitals, and other health care providers—groups that do 
have substantial political influence—also have an interest in lobbying for higher Medicaid rates. 
The organizational heft of the American Medical Association is particularly well-documented. See, 
e.g., Lawrence Gostin, The Formulation of Health Policy by the Three Branches of Government, in 
SOCIETY’S CHOICES: SOCIAL AND ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN BIOMEDICINE 335, 348 
(Ruth Ellen Bulger et al. eds., 1995). 
105 See Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1212 (2012)  
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. (quoting Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 613 (1979)); see 
also Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 107 (1989) (same). 
108 Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1212-13 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
109 Id. at 1213. For a critique of this argument, see generally Stephen I. Vladeck, Douglas and 
the Fate of Ex Parte Young, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 13 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/ 
04/30/vladeck.html. Professor Vladeck argues that the Chief Justice’s reliance on Gonzaga is 
misplaced because that case implicated only Congress’s ability to define when private rights of 
action are available under a federal statute. Id. at 17-18. “In contrast, . . . a plaintiff who seeks 
injunctive relief in a case like Douglas is seeking as much to enforce the Constitution against the 
state officer as he or she is seeking to enforce the relevant federal statute.” Id. at 17.  
110 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 100, at 30 (Roberts, C.J.). 
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it.”111 He would allow offensive use of the Supremacy Clause where, as in 
Ex parte Young, litigants faced the imminent threat of an “enforcement 
proceeding” carrying criminal or civil penalties under an unconstitutional 
state law.112 But where a litigant faced the mere loss of benefits, Chief 
Justice Roberts would hold that Young does not apply.113 As the next 
section will explain, the Court had not previously taken such a cramped 
view of Young or of preemption claims generally. 
Notably absent from the dissent was any discussion of the so-called con-
tract theory of the spending power. It is undisputed that the Spending 
Clause is not simply an instrument for meting out benefits. Rather, Con-
gress may also leverage the power of the purse to persuade states to comply 
with federal policy preferences.114 The Supreme Court has explicitly held 
that Congress may exercise the spending power to achieve indirectly what it 
may not accomplish directly through its enumerated powers in Article I.115 
When states agree to abide by certain conditions in exchange for federal 
largesse, the result is “much in the nature of a contract.” 116 Under the 
common law, third-party beneficiaries generally cannot enforce contract 
terms unless the contracting parties so intended.117 If we consider citizens to 
be like third-party beneficiaries, then the contract theory holds that only the 
federal government may enforce spending conditions against the state 
unless the governing statute confers the right to sue on others.118 As the 
Court observed in Gonzaga, “In legislation enacted pursuant to the 
spending power, the typical remedy for state noncompliance . . . is not a 
private cause of action . . . but rather action by the Federal Government 
to terminate funds to the State.”119  
Douglas presented the Court with the opportunity to hold that spending 
conditions do not admit of private enforcement because of their contract-like 
 
111 Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1213 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
112 See id. 
113 See id. 
114 See generally Hills, supra note 2, at 858-91. 
115 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (holding that Congress could act 
“indirectly under its spending power” to encourage states to set the drinking age at twenty-one, 
whether or not it could “regulate drinking ages directly”); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 
(1936) (“[T]he power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes 
is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.”). 
116 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); see also Barnes v. 
Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002) (same).  
117 See Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cnty., 131 S. Ct. 1342, 1347 (2011) (reciting 
this rule in a spending case). 
118 Id. 
119 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280 (2002) (quoting Pennhurst, 451 at 28). 
12 Meeks Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  11/27/2012 1:20 PM 
2012] Spending Conditions After Douglas 71 
quality, a position urged by Justice Thomas in a recent case.120 The Chief 
Justice’s dissent never alluded to the theory, but it may have inspired his 
reasoning.121 In Pennhurst and other spending cases, the Court has held that 
Congress must speak clearly when imposing funding conditions.122 This 
“notice principle” implies that the federal government must explicitly alert 
the states if private litigants may sue to enforce spending conditions.123 To 
the dissenters, it might have appeared especially improper to subject the 
states to a private right of action unless they manifestly agreed to this mode 
of enforcement when they joined the cooperative spending program. Yet 
the dissent did not adopt this theory, and only future cases will tell whether 
it may have inflected its reasoning. 
IV. LIMITS ON SUPREMACY CLAUSE INJUNCTIONS 
Both the majority and dissent in Douglas expressed doubt that litigants 
may challenge the adequacy of state Medicaid payments under the Suprema-
cy Clause.124 Yet it is clear that plaintiffs may assert preemption claims in at 
least some cases where states play fast and loose with federal spending 
conditions. Courts have been willing to entertain preemption claims when 
states engraft limitations on the use of federal funds that were not envisioned 
by Congress when it created the cooperative spending program in question.125 
Although the contract thesis might suggest otherwise, the federal and state 
governments are not equal partners to the bargain. Congress designs such 
programs, and the states take or leave the funding on the terms offered.126 If 
 
120 See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 683 (2003) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (raising “serious questions as to whether third parties may sue to enforce Spending Clause legislation”). 
121 See Vladeck, supra note 109, at 18 n.26 (venturing the “possibility” that the Douglas dis-
senters were particularly skeptical of private enforcement of spending conditions, but noting their 
language “is hardly limited to prospective enforcement of Spending Clause statutes”). 
122	 See, e.g., Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 24-25.	
123 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 
345, 403, 408 (2008). 
124 Compare Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1210 (2012) (sug-
gesting that CMS’s approval of California’s rate changes “may require” plaintiffs “to proceed by 
seeking review of the agency determination under the [APA] rather than in an action against 
California under the Supremacy Clause”), with id. at 1215 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“When 
Congress did not intend to provide a private right of action to enforce a statute enacted under the 
Spending Clause, the Supremacy Clause does not supply one of its own force.”). 
125 See, e.g., Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 600, 604 (1972) (holding restrictive state 
eligibility criteria for certain federal welfare benefits invalid under the Supremacy Clause); 
Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 285 (1971) (holding, in a § 1983 suit, that an Illinois law 
restricting eligibility for certain federal educational benefits was “invalid under the Supremacy Clause”). 
126 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2630 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., con-
curring in part, concurring in the judgment, and dissenting in part) (“States have no entitlement to 
receive any Medicaid funds; they enjoy only the opportunity to accept funds on Congress’ terms.”). 
12 Meeks Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)11/27/2012 1:20 PM 
72 University of Pennsylvania Law Review PENNumbra [Vol. 161: 56 
 
a state imposes additional regulatory burdens, it may “interfere with the 
careful balance struck by Congress” between competing policy goals.127  
Should Douglas return to the Supreme Court, the Justices would almost 
certainly seek to place limits on its implied right of action theory. There is a 
way to do so without altogether foreclosing the possibility of a Supremacy 
Clause action in the spending context. The Justices should distinguish 
between two types of preemption challenges that may arise out of coopera-
tive spending programs: (1) those alleging direct conflict between federal 
and state regulations and (2) those, such as Douglas, alleging insufficient 
state performance. The Court should continue recognizing Supremacy 
Clause actions in the first type of case. But in the second, where states are 
merely truant in their obligations under a cooperative spending program, it 
is less obvious that litigants should be able to ask the courts to intervene, at 
least under the Supremacy Clause.  
A. Viable Supremacy Clause Actions 
Planned Parenthood of Houston & Southeast Texas v. Sanchez, 128 from 
the Fifth Circuit, provides a good example of a case in which a Suprem-
acy Clause action should be sustained. There the federal government 
provided funds to the states through the Public Health Service Act to 
help expand access to family planning, on the condition that the money 
not be used for abortions.129 Unsatisfied that this condition protected 
incipient life, Texas passed a law restricting distribution of the federal 
funds to groups that performed elective abortions, even if the abortion 
procedures were paid for with private donations. 130  Six Planned 
Parenthood clinics, which had previously segregated abortion from other 
family planning services to remain eligible for the federal funds, brought 
suit directly under the Supremacy Clause.131  
The Fifth Circuit recognized that the plaintiffs had “an implied right of 
action to seek injunctive relief from a state statute purportedly preempted by 
federal Spending Clause legislation.”132 It concluded, however, that the Texas 
law might be saved through a narrowing construction that permitted groups 
like Planned Parenthood to continue receiving funds if they created  
 
127 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2505 (2012).  
128 403 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2005).  
129 Id. at 327. 
130 Id. at 328. 
131 Id. at 327-29. 
132 Id. at 335.  
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“affiliates,” or separate legal entities, to provide abortion services.133 Absent 
such a construction, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the state law would almost 
certainly be “doomed to preemption”134 because it excluded certain groups that 
Congress intended to include in the federal program.135 While a state may 
impose “modest impediments” on the groups receiving federal funds, “a state 
eligibility standard that altogether excludes entities that might otherwise be 
eligible for federal funds is invalid under the Supremacy Clause.”136 
Sanchez is a classic case for preemption, and it illustrates precisely why 
the Ex parte Young remedy is needed in the spending context. State legisla-
tors face internal political pressures, and they may be tempted to use the 
federal bounty to please local constituents at the expense of federal policy. 
Although Texas and the federal government arguably shared the objective 
of minimizing taxpayer-funded abortions, Texas’s more restrictive policy 
risked upsetting the compromise Congress had struck between restricting 
abortions and improving access to health care. The Supreme Court has 
consistently found such “additional or auxiliary regulations” preempted 
when they interfere with Congress’s careful weighing of legislative alterna-
tives.137 In this case, the Fifth Circuit identified a narrowing construction 
that avoided a head-on collision between federal and state law. Yet it also 
recognized that, had no such construction been available, the Supremacy 
Clause suit would have been an important tool for vindicating the federal 
interest and restoring the balance upset by the competing state law. 
PhRMA v. Walsh likewise concerned state action that risked undermining 
goals the federal government sought to achieve through a cooperative spend-
ing program.138 In an effort to make prescription drugs more affordable, 
Maine required drug manufacturers that participated in Medicaid to offer 
rebates to uninsured residents.139 If the manufacturers refused, Medicaid 
patients had to obtain approval from the state before purchasing the 
company’s drugs. 140  The drug companies believed this administrative 
hurdle would reduce sales, and they brought suit for injunctive relief on 
the ground that Maine’s statute was preempted by the Medicaid Act.141 
 
133 Id. at 341.  
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 338. 
136 Id. at 336-37. 
137 Cf. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012) (“Permitting the State to 
impose its own penalties for the federal offense here would conflict with the careful 
framework Congress adopted.”). 
138 Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 653-54 (2003). 
139 Id. at 653-55. 
140 Id. at 654. 
141 Id. at 650, 656. 
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The Supreme Court sided with the state on the merits, holding that the 
state did not run afoul of the federal program by imposing “minimal or 
quite modest” burdens on Medicaid recipients in order to make prescrip-
tions more widely available to its residents.142 At the same time, a majori-
ty of the Court implicitly recognized that third parties had a cause of 
action to challenge state laws that might chafe against the Medicaid Act’s 
objectives. 143  Only Justices Scalia and Thomas, who filed concurring 
opinions, questioned the premise of the suit. Justice Scalia argued that the 
Medicaid Act provides only one remedy, termination of federal funding to 
the states, and the drug companies could seek relief from the courts only 
where CMS’s refusal to terminate was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion under the APA.144 Justice Thomas relied on the contract theory 
and expressed doubts “as to whether third parties may sue to enforce 
Spending Clause legislation—through pre-emption or otherwise.”145  
Sanchez and PhRMA recognized the important ends served by implied 
rights of action under the Supremacy Clause. In our system of dual sover-
eignty, the clause helps maintain the proper distribution of federal and state 
power.146 In concert with the Tenth Amendment, it supplies the principle 
that federal law bests contrary state law as long as the federal government is 
operating within its sphere of limited and enumerated powers.147 Sanchez and 
PhRMA demonstrate that states may impose modest burdens that were not 
contemplated by Congress on potential federal aid recipients. But these 
restrictions must not frustrate the accomplishment of federal goals or distort 
the nature of federal programs. In such cases, the Supremacy Clause right of 
action would restore the proper balance of authority and keep states within 
 
142 Id. at 671 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal quotation omitted). 
143 See Planned Parenthood of Hous. & Se. Tex. v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 332 (5th Cir. 
2005) (observing that, in PhRMA, “seven Justices assumed both that the federal courts have 
jurisdiction and that a claim was stated for Spending Clause preemption”). 
144 PhRMA, 538 U.S. at 675 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
145 Id. at 683 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
146 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159 (1992) (“We have observed that the 
Supremacy Clause gives the Federal Government a decided advantage in the delicate balance 
the Constitution strikes between state and federal power.” (brackets and internal quotation 
omitted)); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 265 (2000) (“The Supreme Court 
routinely says that valid federal statutes preempt whatever state law ‘stands as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” (quoting 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))).  
147 See New York, 505 U.S. at 156 (“If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, 
the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power 
is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the 
Constitution has not conferred on Congress.”). 
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the bounds of the law.148 Chief Justice Roberts, writing in dissent in Douglas, 
appeared to cabin Ex parte Young to cases where parties faced an imminent 
state enforcement proceeding, with possible criminal or civil sanctions, rather 
than a loss of benefits.149 This reading would seem to foreclose application of 
the Young remedy in cases like Sanchez and PhRMA, even though they fit the 
mold of a traditional preemption claim. Such a view would risk gelding 
Congress’s authority to dictate how federal funds will be spent. 
B. Douglas-Style Supremacy Clause Actions 
Douglas bears a superficial resemblance to Sanchez and PhRMA, but it 
differs from them in at least one important way. Douglas involved state 
spending rather than state regulation of conduct, and it therefore touched 
on an important state sovereignty interest not implicated by Sanchez or 
PhRMA. Congress created Medicaid to make health care available to the 
poor and elderly, but it did not necessarily intend for states to sacrifice their 
freedom to shape their own spending priorities. If the Supreme Court were 
to recognize an implied right of action under the Supremacy Clause, it 
would shift delicate budgeting decisions from state legislatures to the 
federal courts and potentially award Medicaid recipients a greater share of 
state spending than they would receive through the political process.150 
Health care already consumes a substantial percentage of state budgets,151 
and private litigation that forces states to devote more resources to Medi-
caid could result in the crowding out of other worthy programs. Congress 
avoided such distortion effects by limiting the remedies available to  
 
148 See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (“Remedies designed to end a continuing 
violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of 
that law.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1778-79 (1991) (“Another principle, whose focus 
is more structural, demands a system of constitutional remedies adequate to keep government 
generally within the bounds of law.”); cf. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2360 (2011) 
(holding that the defendant had standing to challenge the statute under which she was convicted 
on the ground that “Congress exceeded its powers by enacting it in contravention of basic 
federalism principles” secured by the Tenth Amendment).  
149 See Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1213 (2012)  
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
150 See supra note 54 and accompanying text; see also Huberfeld, supra note 24, at 539 (“Medi-
caid has long been regarded as a program that requires cost containment.”); Abby Goodnough, 
Spending on Medicaid Has Slowed, Survey Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2012, at A24 (quoting the 
executive vice president of the Kaiser Family Foundation as saying of Medicaid expenditures, 
“Reining in costs remains the dominant theme”). 
151 See Theodore W. Ruger, Of Icebergs and Glaciers: The Submerged Constitution of American 
Healthcare, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 220 (2012) (“The Congressional Budget 
Office . . . forecasts that, if present trends continue, overall healthcare spending will account 
for 25% of GDP by 2025, 37% by 2050, and 49% by 2082.”).  
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beneficiaries for a state’s underfunding of its Medicaid obligations. It 
concentrated enforcement in the federal agency and gave that agency one 
tool to discipline the states—withdrawal of all Medicaid funding—that was 
so harsh it would almost never be used.152 Inadequate though this system 
may be to secure robust state funding for Medicaid, it preserves some 
measure of state control over sensitive and difficult budgeting decisions.153  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Medicaid reflects our society’s noblest intentions, but in practice it does 
not always provide meaningful access to health care. The program reimburses 
health providers far less than Medicare or private health insurance does, 
and newspapers and academic journals are filled with stories of patients who 
suffered dire medical consequences because they could not locate a doctor 
who would accept their Medicaid card.154 While private enforcement of the 
equal access provision would almost certainly lead to more robust funding 
of Medicaid, it might also distort state budgeting decisions in ways neither 
intended by Congress nor consented to by the states. If more money should 
be dedicated to the program, it should happen through the political process. 
And there is hope for this yet. As part of the Affordable Care Act, Congress 
has offered the states a substantial financial inducement to extend Medicaid 
coverage to all adults under age sixty-five who live below 133% of the 
poverty line.155 Should the Medicaid ranks swell, a large new pool of voters 
will have incentive to lobby state and federal representatives for more 




152 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 692 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The funding 
cutoff is a drastic sanction, one which [the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare] has 
proved unwilling or unable to employ to compel strict compliance with the Act and regulations.”). 
153 Indeed, concern that excessive resort to litigation was increasing the cost of the Medicaid 
program helped drive the repeal of the Boren Amendment, the provision of the Medicaid Act that 
required states to set payments at a level “reasonable and adequate to meet the costs” of providing 
care. See TOMMY G. THOMPSON, SEC’Y OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON THE IMPACT OF REPEAL OF THE BOREN AMENDMENT 3-4 (2003).  
154 See, e.g., Rosemary B. Guiltinan, Note, Enforcing a Critical Entitlement: Preemption Claims 
as an Alternative Way to Protect Medicaid Recipients’ Access to Healthcare, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1583, 
1583-84 (2010) (relaying the story of a twelve-year-old boy who died in Maryland in 2007 from a 
brain infection caused by a tooth abscess after his mother searched in vain for a dentist who would 
take his Medicaid card); Devi M. Rao, Note, “Making Medical Assistance Available”: Enforcing the 
Medicaid Act’s Availability Provision Through § 1983 Litigation, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1440, 1441 
(2009) (collecting cases regarding state failures to provide access to care).  
155 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (Supp. IV 2010). 
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